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I. INTRODUCTION
There's no fresh start in today's world. Any twelve-year-old
with a cell phone could find out what you did. Everything we
do is collated and Quantified. Everything sticks. We are the
sum of our mistakes.
Once upon a time, reinvention was an integral part of the myth of the
American Dream: as the story went, one could leave the old country or old
neighborhood, without looking back-fashioning one's own second chance by
stepping into a newer, better identity, crafting a redesigned life story out of
whole cloth if necessary.2 As one legal historian noted, "American culture and
law put enormous emphasis on second chances." 3 For most of the 20th century,
this notion of the second chance was also alive and well in the American
criminal justice system, 4 as rehabilitation was considered its primary goal.5
I THE DARK KNIGHT RISES (Warner Bros. Pictures 2012). In an early scene of The Dark
Knight Rises, Selina Kyle-a.k.a. Catwoman-laments that her life choices are severely
restricted by her criminal past, noting further that, "Once you've done what you had to, they'll
never let you do what you want to." Id.
2 See Lawrence M. Friedman, Name Robbers: Privacy, Blackmail, and Assorted Matters in
Legal History, 30 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1093, 1112 (2002) ("American society is and has been a
society of extreme mobility.... People often moved from place to place; they shed an old life
like a snake molting its skin. They took on new lives and new identities.").
3 Id. at 1112.
4 Early American state legislatures promulgated laws in line with earlier European ideas that
certain of the rights and privileges of citizenship should be denied to those convicted of criminal
offenses. However, by the middle of the twentieth century "indirect forms of punishment were
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The 1980s advent of the War on Drugs 6 and the "tough-on-crime ' 7
policies that it spawned effectively ended second chances for those with
criminal records.8 For the past four decades, not only have prison populations
exploded, 9 and sentence lengths increased dramatically, 0 but also the number
of collateral consequences of conviction faced by the formerly incarcerated" I
strongly criticized by legal reformers and restricted by state legislatures." Jeremy Travis,
Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 15, 17-18 (Marc Maurer & Meda
Chesney-Lind, eds., 2002).
5 See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949) ("Retribution is no longer the
dominant objective of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become
important goals of criminal jurisprudence.").
6 The War on Drugs is a comprehensive policy aimed at the reduction of the illegal drug
trade. See generally ALEXANDER COCKBURN & JEFFREY ST. CLAIR, WHITEOUT: THE CIA, DRUGS
AND THE PRESS (1999). It consists of the prohibition of drugs, the provision of military aid to and
intervention in drug-producing countries, and the adoption of stringent enforcement policies. Id.
7 In many cases, prison populations soared as a result both of "sustained crackdown[s] on
drugs and quality of life crimes." THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, TIME SERVED: THE HIGH
COST, Low RETURN OF LONGER PRISON TERMS 23 (2012) (emphasis added), available at
http://bridgemi.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/PSPPTime-Served-Report-embargoedJune_
6_2012.pdf. A Pew Center study revealed that a number of "tough-on-crime" measures added to
the length of average prison stays and the number of incarcerated individuals. For instance, the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 provided to states federal Violent-
Offender Incarceration and Truth-In-Sentencing grants, provided that those classified as "violent
offenders" served 85% of their original sentences. Id. at 24. This prompted some states to
accelerate prison expansion in order to comply. Id. "Moreover, many states [enacted] habitual
offender laws with sentence enhancements that. . . greatly boost[ed] time served in prison." Id.
8 President Ronald Regan officially declared the War on Drugs in 1982. MICHELLE
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 5
(2010). However, Gerald L6pez notes that this shift actually began in the 1970s. Gerald P. L6pez,
How Mainstream Reformers Design Ambitious Reentry Programs Doomed to Fail and Destined
to Reinforce Targeted Mass Incarceration and Social Control, 11 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY
L.J. 1, 4-5 (2014).
9 See L6pez, supra note 8, at 4-5 ("Beginning in the 1970s, the criminal justice system
(federal and states) transformed its laws, its institutions, its policies, and its practices in ways that
caused the rate of imprisonment to multiply in unprecedented terms over the next four
decades."); see also Jelani Jefferson Exum, Sentencing, Drugs, and Prisons: A Lesson From
Ohio, 42 U. TOL. L. REv. 881 (2011). But see Nicole D. Porter, The Sentencing Project, On the
Chopping Block 2013: State Prison Closures, http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/
incOn%20the%2OChopping%20Block%202013.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2014) (documenting a
modest 1.7% decline in the U.S. prison population from 2011-2012).
10 THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, supra note 7, at 2 (noting that prisoners released in 2009
served 36% longer terms than those released in 1990).
II I recognize the term "ex-offender" as pejorative and, therefore, throughout this Article use
terms such as "previously-convicted" and "formerly incarcerated" to refer to those who bear "ex-
offender status." I use the term "ex-offender status" to refer to the negative status of having been
2014]
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upon release have proliferated. 12 Collateral consequence of incarceration or
"invisible punishments," as one scholar coined them "are those that, rather than
having been imposed upon the convicted individual by a sentencing judge,
'take effect outside of the traditional sentencing framework ... by operation of
law [and are, therefore] not considered part of the practice or jurisprudence of
sentencing."''13 They have functioned to "internally exile" previously-convicted
individuals, cutting them off from mainstream society and thwarting reentry
and reintegration.'
In his 2004 State of the Union Address, President George W. Bush
signaled renewed hope for the availability of second chances for those with
criminal records by announcing the Prisoner Reentry Initiative.15 This initiative
was eventually codified into the Second Chance Act of 2007.16 Among the
Second Chance Act's listed purposes were "to assist offenders reentering the
community from incarceration to establish a self-sustaining and law-abiding
life by providing sufficient transitional services"' 17 and "to provide offenders in
prisons, jails or juvenile facilities with educational, literacy, vocational, and job
placement services to facilitate re-entry into the community."' 8 The goals of the
Second Chance Act, though laudable, are lacking. Approximately 650,000
convicted of or having pleaded guilty to a criminal offense, but will avoid using "ex-offender"
when referring to actual people or classes of people. This decision is in keeping with the practice
established in my previous article and with that of a growing number of scholars, lawyers,
activists, and previously-convicted persons themselves of de-emphasizing the term "ex-offender"
as pejorative and recognizing the harmful effects of such labeling. See Jamila Jefferson-Jones, A
Good Name: Applying Regulatory Takings Analysis to Reputational Damage Caused by
Criminal History, 116 W. VA. L. REv. 497, 499 n.8 (2013).
12 For example, in the ten-year period from 1986-1996, the number of states disenfranchising
those convicted of felonies, terminating their parental rights, making felony conviction a ground
for divorce, restricting the rights of the previously convicted to hold public office and/or
restricting their right to own or possess firearms increased in each of the aforementioned
categories. Travis, supra note 4, at 22.
13 Jefferson-Jones, supra note 11 (quoting Travis, supra note 4, at 16).
14 Travis, supra note 4, at 19.
15 George W. Bush, U.S. President, Report on the State of the Union Delivered to a Joint
Session of Congress, 150 Cong. Rec. S33 (daily ed. Jan 20, 2004), available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html ("Tonight
I ask you to consider another group of Americans in need of help. This year, some 600,000
inmates will be released from prison back into society. We know from long experience that if
they can't find work, or a home, or help, they are much more likely to commit crime and return
to prison. So tonight, I propose a four-year, $300 million prisoner re-entry initiative to expand
job training and placement services, to provide transitional housing, and to help newly released
prisoners get mentoring, including from faith-based groups. America is the land of second chance
[sic], and when the gates of the prison open, the path ahead should lead to a better life.").
16 Second Chance Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-199, 122 Stat. 657 (2008) (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 17501-17555 (2013)).
17 42 U.S.C. § 17501(a)(5) (2013).
18 Id. § 17501(a)(6).
[Vol. 117
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people are released from state and federal prisons each year. 19 Additionally,
20% of the United States population has a criminal past.20 The civil disabilities
resulting from the various collateral consequences of incarceration that they
face-including the collateral consequence of damaged reputations-are
nothing short of debilitating. Given this reality, the Second Chance Act's goals
cannot be fully realized without the added measure of "rebiography," which in
the reentry context is the ability of one with a criminal record to "rewrite his or
her history to make it more in line with his or her present, reformed identity. 1
A measure of rebiography already exists in other areas of the American
legal system. Rebiography, for instance, is institutionalized in the sealing of
juvenile records and the expiration of negative credit histories for those who
have filed bankruptcy. However, as criminologist Shadd Maruna notes, this
"autobiographical creativity" is not currently extended to the "[c]ommon
criminal., 23 Rather, it is reserved for "people we believe in-a juvenile [or] a
debtor. ... ,24 Yet, "[w]ithout this [same] right [of rebiography], ex-offenders
will always be ex-offenders, hence outsiders, or the Other., 25 Thus, the goals
and purposes of reentry efforts, like those supported by the Second Chance Act,
will remain frustrated.26
In A Good Name: Applying Regulato7  Takings Analysis to
Reputational Damage Caused by Criminal History, I couched the need for
rebiography upon reentry in terms of the ongoing reputational damage suffered
by the previously convicted. I then applied a regulatory takings analysis to that
reputational damage. In doing so, I analyzed the critical property-like
characteristics of reputation, concluding that reputation is a form of "status
19 Prisoners and Prisoner Re-Entry, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/archive/
fbci/progmenu reentry.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2014).
20 Ben Geiger, Note, The Case for Treating Ex-Offenders as a Suspect Class, 94 CALIF. L.
REV. 1191, 1193 (2006).





25 Id. at 165. Maruna goes on to warn that "[t]his selective application of the 'forgive and
forget' doctrine can recreate the supposed dichotomy between Us and Them." Id. at 164.
26 See, e.g., id. at 9-10 (citing "rebiographing" as integral to a previously-convicted person's
efforts to "make good," which is defined as "find[ing] reason and purpose in the bleakest of life
histories"); JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER REENTRY
219 (2003) ("[W]iping the slate clean or allowing a 'legal rebiographing' is critical to offenders
who have made the decision to desist from crime.").
27 Jefferson-Jones, supra note 11.
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property" 28 and that such continued stigma attachment and reputational damage
constitutes a "taking" without just compensation. 29 I then argued that
rebiography can serve as "just compensation" for this type of taking.3°
Rebiography as "just compensation" for the reputational taking
suffered by the previously convicted leaves open two questions: First, does the
takings analysis have the same outcome regardless of the offender? In other
words, does an offender have to try to use her reputation in a positive manner
and be prevented from doing so in order to have a takings claim, or is it enough
to say that requiring disclosure of criminal history is a taking across the board
that always requires just compensation? Secondly, what is the relationship
between "rebiography" and "privacy"?
With regard to the former question, it appears a stronger argument may
be made that only one who has taken steps to rehabilitate or who cannot find
employment because of discrimination based upon her past criminal
convictions has experienced a taking, rather than a blanket rule that any
required disclosure of criminal history yields a takings claim. As far as privacy
is concerned, one must weigh the size of the transgression against the need for
public accountability. In the case of those who have criminal records, the
general question is when privacy should be restored and, more particularly,
when or whether a certain individual has met the criteria for restored reputation
through the restoration of privacy-rebiography being the tool of that
restoration.
In A Good Name, I established continued stigma attachment as a
governmental taking. I now seek to show that "just compensation" is owed to
the previously convicted and that the way to provide it is through establishing a
"rebiography right," stemming from the taking of a constitutionally cognizable
property right. In Part II of this Article, I review the application of the Takings
Clause to the reputational damage suffered by the previously convicted and
apply this analysis to actual cases. In Part III, I explain why rebiography is
necessary given statistics on the previously convicted's employment prospects
and recidivism. I go on to examine legislative and judicial options for
rebiography.
28 See id. at 501 n.16 ("Most simply put, 'status property' is that property which is linked to
identity."); see also Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REv. 2151, 2154, 2159
(2013) (defining "status property" as "a reputational interest that endows the owners with certain
privileges flowing from a public conception of their identity and personhood," and "that can be
both analogized to conventional forms of property and literally converted to those forms").
29 Jefferson-Jones, supra note 11, at 508-25.
30 Id. at 525-27.
[Vol. 117
6
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 117, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 9
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol117/iss1/9
REBIOGRAPHYAS "JUST COMPENSATION"
ii. A REVIEW OF THE APPLICATION OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE TO THE
REPUTATIONAL DAMAGE SUFFERED BY THE PREVIOUSLY CONVICTED
A previously-convicted individual who is seeking to establish a claim
pursuant to the Takings Clause3l must identify (1) the property taken; (2) the
governmental conduct that resulted in the taking; and (3) the just compensation
that would remedy the taking.32 In A Good Name, I argued that the property
taken was the previously-convicted person's reputation-a type of "status
property. 33 Next, I contended that the damage to reputation suffered by those
with criminal records-even after their terms of incarceration or other criminal
punishment have been completed-is the governmental conduct that results in a
taking.34
In this Article, I argue that rebiography is the just compensation due for
the taking suffered by the previously convicted. Section A of this Part serves as
a review of the regulatory takings analysis in A Good Name and introduces the
concept of examining these takings under the Unconstitutional Conditions
Doctrine. Part B applies these analyses to actual cases.
A. The Regulation of the Reputations of the Previously Convicted "Goes
Too Far"
The damage to reputation suffered by those with criminal records
results in a "regulatory taking"--one in which the government has regulated
the property in question to such a great extent as to constitute a constructive
taking of that property. In the reentry context, the government conduct
resulting in this regulatory taking is the unfettered imposition of collateral
31 The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides, "[N]or shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Takings Clause
applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or
shall any State deprive any person of. . . property, without due process of law .... ).
32 See John Martinez, Wrongful Convictions as Rightful Takings: Protecting "Liberty-
Property, " 59 HASTINGS L.J. 515, 547 (2008).
33 Jefferson-Jones, supra note 11, at 509 ("A takings analysis that analogizes the collateral
consequence of stigma attachment and continued reputational damage to an impermissible taking
must first establish reputation as cognizable private property under the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment."). See id. at 510-19 for an in-depth discussion of the property-like
characteristics of reputation.
34 Id. at 508, 519-25.
35 The idea of the "regulatory taking" was first introduced by the Supreme Court in Pa. Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
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consequences of conviction, generally, and, specifically, the collateral
consequence of ongoing reputational damage.36
In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,37 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr., writing for the Court, famously concluded that, with regard to government
regulation of property rights, "[t]he general rule at least is that while property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking., 38 Justice Holmes did not give specific guidance
regarding what "go[ing] too far" might consist of short of the per se taking that
results when the regulation can be categorized as "appropriating or destroying"
the property in question.39 In A Good Name, however, I concluded that in the
reentry context, "[o]nce reputation is established as property, then the
government conduct can be identified, not only as the attachment of stigma,4 °
but as the continued assault on reputation by the ongoing attachment of stigma,
even after one's sentence has been served...."41
1. Per Se Takings
The Supreme Court has formulated three specific per se takings rules:
(1) the permanent physical occupation rule; (2) the harm exception defense;
42
and (3) total wipeout or complete deprivation of all economic value.43
36 See Jefferson-Jones, supra note 11, at 502-04 (discussing the expansion of the definition of
"collateral consequences" to include "informal, non-legal and social consequences of
incarceration").
37 260 U.S. 393 (1922). The issue in Pennsylvania Coal was whether the effect of the Kohler
Act-which prohibited the mining of anthracite coal in a manner that, among other things, would
cause subsidence to any residential structure-amounted to a taking. The Court held that "[t]o
make it commercially impracticable to mine certain coal has very nearly the same effect for
constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it." Id. at 414.
38 Id. at 415.
39 Id. at 414-15.
40 A stigma is a "socially inferior attribute," which is "attached to" or "marks" the carrier as
one who deviates from prevailing social norms. Scholars classify the stigma carried by those with
ex-offender status as "conduct" or "moral" stigma. Conduct stigma is distinguishable from the
other two categories of stigma-(1) "physical" stigma related to physical deformity or disability
and (2) "tribal" stigma resulting from racial or ethnic difference-in that the carriers of these
stigmas are not accorded blame for their attachment. Conduct stigma, on the other hand, taints
the carrier as one possessing weak character. See ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE
MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 4-5 (1963).
41 Jefferson-Jones, supra note 11, at 509-10.
42 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N. Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
43 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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i. Permanent Physical Occupation
Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing for the majority in Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,4 advised that "a physical intrusion by
government [is] a property restriction of an unusually serious character for
purposes of the Takings Clause... [and] that when the physical intrusion
reaches the extreme form of a permanent physical occupation, a taking has
occurred. 4 5 Although reputational damage does not constitute physical
invasion, the character of regulation and permanent damage through stigma
attachment and collateral consequences is, nonetheless, akin to this type of per
se taking. Loretto speaks to the permanence of the invasion of property rights,
not just to the physical nature of such an invasion. "Thus, if one considers the
permanence of damaged reputation, then the government's regulation of the
reputations of the previously convicted can, at least conceptually, be akin to
such a per se taking. 46
ii. The Harm Exception Defense
"Public safety" is the oft-identified "public use" or "public purpose"
47
of collateral consequences of conviction and the continued attachment of ex-
offender status to the previously convicted. 48 Historically, this exercise of the
state's police power has provided the state with a per se harm exception
defense, the result of which was that the exercise of such power was deemed to
not be a taking for which just compensation is due. 49 The modem view of the
Takings Clause, however, is that its public use requirement is "coterminous
with the scope of a sovereign's police powers."5 Such a view clears the way
44 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
45 Id. at 426 (emphasis added).
46 Jefferson-Jones, supra note 11, at 522.
47 The "public use" language of the Takings Clause has been interpreted to mean "public
purpose," rather than actual use by the public. See Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S.
469, 479-80 (2005).
48 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.0111(1) (West 2014) ("The Legislature declares that a
goal of this state is to clearly identify the occupations from which ex-offenders are disqualified
based on the nature of their offenses.., in a manner that serves to preserve and protect the...
safety... of the general public.").
49 See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668 (1887) ("A prohibition simply upon the use
of property for purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health,
morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking."); see also
Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 61, 70 (1986) ("[T]he
outer limit of the police power has traditionally marked the line between noncompensable
regulation and compensable takings of property .... Legitimately exercised, the police power
requires no compensation." (emphasis in original)).
50 Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984).
2014]
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for the application of the factors that the Supreme Court identified in Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York 51 to the regulation of and
subsequent damage to reputation suffered by the previously convicted. Thus,
the question to be answered in analyzing whether a taking has happened to a
previously-convicted person is not whether the harm exception defense applies
because of a valid exercise of the police power, but rather, whether the police
power so exercised "goes too far" under a Penn Central analysis.
Ex-offender status represents the merger of both identity and status52 to
create a "master status" 53 that constrains liberty through the all-encompassing
imposition of collateral consequences of conviction. "This is because damage
to reputation as a collateral consequence of conviction is the result of
government regulation that restricts property rights in a manner that
significantly diminishes their value and causes substantial, but, arguably,
compensable harm to the affected individual. 54 In doing so, this regulation of
property rights in reputation through collateral consequences, in effect, "goes
too far."'55
51 438 U.S. 104 (1978). In Penn Central, the owner of Grand Central Terminal in New York
City alleged that, by denying it a permit to build a skyscraper atop the terminal, the City had
affected a regulatory taking of its air rights. The Court disagreed with the owner. In doing so, it
noted that, in order to make such a determination, it is necessary to balance the three factors, each
of which is discussed in depth in Part II.A.2. of this Article.
52 In her celebrated law review article Whiteness as Property, Cheryl Harris argues that
"whiteness" is "status property" and, as such, functions as "identity, status, and property,
sometimes singularly, sometimes in tandem." Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106
HARV. L. REv. 1707, 1725 (1993). In A Good Name, I argue that ex-offender status evolves from
a mere legal status into an aspect of identity. Jefferson-Jones, supra note 11, at 5 10.
53 "The master status of an individual is one which, in most or all social situations, will
overpower or dominate all other statuses .... Master status influences every other aspect of life,
including personal identity. Since status is a social label and not a personal choice, the individual
has little control over his or her master status in any given social interaction." JOHN SCOTT &
GORDON MARSHALL, A DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY (3d ed. 2009), available at
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199533008.001.000 1/acref-978019953
3008-e-1365 (defining "master status"); see also TODD R. CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITmS:
How MASS INCARCERATION MAKES DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE 125 (2007) ("It is
clear that being convicted of a crime and sent to prison carries a stigma, and being a criminal can
become a person's master status.").
54 Jefferson-Jones, supra note 11, at 508.
55 In Pennsylvania Coal, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. noted that "if [government]
regulation [of property rights] goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Pa. Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (emphasis added). The notion of government regulation
"go[ing] too far" is explored in more detail herein.
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iii. Complete Deprivation ofAll Economically Beneficial or
Productive Use
In Pennsylvania Coal, Justice Holmes alluded to a regulation that
"appropriates or destroys" property as a per se taking. 56 This per se rule was
clarified by the Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.57 Here, the
Court held that a taking occurs "where regulation denies all economically
beneficial or productive use" of the regulated property.58 Thus, in the extreme
case, where a total wipeout of reputation has been exacted upon a previously
convicted person, a per se taking shall have occurred.59 Such a 100%
diminution in value must be calculated in the same manner as lesser
diminutions.
2. The Application of the Penn Central Multi-Factor Balancing Test
With the public purpose of collateral consequences of conviction
identified as "public safety," courts may proceed to analyze a previously-
convicted individual's takings claim by applying the Penn Central multi-factor
balancing test. This multi-factor test focuses on: (1) the character of the
regulation; (2) the extent of the law's interference with distinct investment-
backed expectations; and (3) the diminution in value of the property resulting
from the regulation.60
The character of the regulation of the reputations of the previously
convicted results in permanent damage to the "status property" of reputation.
6'
56 Id.
57 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
58 Id. at 1015.
59 A case of such a total wipeout of reputational value can be found among those labeled as
"sex offenders." The most extreme case is that of the over 100 registered sex offenders who were
forced to live in a makeshift camp under the Julia Tuttle Causeway in Miami, Florida from 2006
until 2010 because a local ordinance prohibited them from living within 2,500 feet of schools,
parks, bus stops, or daycare centers. See Charles Rabin & Scott Hiaasen, From Julia Tuttle
Bridge to Shorecrest Street Corner: Miami Sex Offenders Again Living on Street, PALM BEACH
POST, Mar. 12, 2012, available at http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/news/crime-law/from-
julia-tuttle-bridge-to-shorecrest-street-corn/nLhZz/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2014).
60 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978).
61 The Penn Central Court found that "[a] 'taking' may more readily be found when the
interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government." Id. at
124. The easy case of physical invasion was further clarified by the Court's opinion in Loretto, in
which the Court decided that any permanent physical occupation of property is a per se taking,
regardless of the public interest served by the occupation. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982). As I noted in A Good Name, "Because the reputation of
the previously convicted person is intangible property, it cannot be physically invaded by the
government, like the landlords' buildings in Loretto. However, as noted above, Loretto speaks,
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An owner's investment-backed expectations, as envisioned by the Penn Central
Court, must be "distinct," rather than merely hypothetical. Thus, the diminution
in value test 62 queries "whether or not the measure in question can easily be
seen to have practically deprived the claimant of some distinctly perceived,
sharply crystallized, investment-backed expectation. 63  Consequently, in
instances where the previously-convicted person has made an investment in her
own rehabilitation-where, for instance, she has participated in drug or alcohol
treatment programs or availed herself of educational or vocational training
opportunities-her actual investment-backed expectations of her ability to
reintegrate upon reentry are certainly "distinctly perceived [and] sharply
crystallized." Finally, the diminution in value of the previously-convicted
individual's reputation must be analyzed in conjunction with these same
investment-backed expectations.64
The traditional measure of just compensation in physical takings claims
is money damages, which are calculated by determining the market value of the
property in question.65 However, in regulatory taking claims, just compensation
is calculated using the "fraction of value destroyed" test, which compares the
value of the subject property prior to the regulation with its post-regulation
value.66 Because the status property taking suffered by the previously convicted
is regulatory in nature and the property taken is incorporeal and market-
inalienable, the "fraction of value destroyed" test is more appropriate for
evaluating "just compensation" in this context.
In some cases, it may be possible, to some extent, to quantify the lost
economic opportunity of a particular previously-convicted person. However, it
must be remembered that a calculation of lost earnings does not tell the whole
story. Such calculation cannot take into account, for instance, unrealized or
forgone opportunities.
not just to the physical nature of the invasion, but also to the permanence of the invasion caused
by the government regulation." Jefferson-Jones, supra note 11, at 522.
62 Courts determine diminution in value by comparing the value of the subject property prior
to the regulation with its post-regulation value. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation " Law, 80 HARV. L. REv.
1165, 1232-33 (1967) (describing the "fraction of value destroyed" test).
63 Id. at 1233.
64 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 127.
65 See United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970) ("'[J]ust compensation' means the
full monetary equivalent of the property taken."); see also Coniston Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman
Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1988) ("'[Jlust compensation' has been held to be satisfied
by payment of market value.").
66 See Michelman, supra note 62, at 1232-33 ("The 'fraction of value destroyed' test...
appears to proceed by first trying to isolate some 'thing' owned by the person complaining ....
Once having thus found the denominator of the fraction, the test proceeds to ask what proportion
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3. The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine
In addition to applying the Penn Central multi-factor balancing test in
its analysis of a previously-convicted person's takings claim, a court may also
find the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to be instructive. This doctrine
was initially introduced in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission67 and has
been applied in the context where the state has placed a condition on the
development of property. The doctrine was further refined by the Court in its
decision in Dolan v. City of Tigard.68 The Supreme Court's analysis of
unconstitutional conditions includes (1) whether an "essential nexus" exists
between the proposed condition and the legitimate interest of the state69 and, if
such an "essential nexus" does exist, (2) whether there is a "rough
proportionality" between the state's justification for the condition and the
condition itself.70 While Nollan and Dolan each took place in the land-use
context, there is a strong argument that the conditions placed on the use and
enjoyment of reputational property--especially the rehabilitated reputational
property-of the previously convicted lack both the essential nexus and rough
proportionality required by the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. In Nollan,
the Supreme Court confirmed that, when the government places restrictions on
the use of private property, such restrictions must substantially further a
governmental purpose.7' In Dolan, the Court noted that "[o]ne of the principal
purposes of the Takings Clause is to 'bar Government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burden which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole."'
72
i. Essential Nexus
In Nollan, property owners brought an action against the California
Coastal Commission because it had conditioned their rebuilding permit on a
requirement that the owners provide an easement across their beachfront
67 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
68 512 U.S. 374 (1994). Even more recently, the Court noted that the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine applies both when permission to develop property has been denied and when
the exaction involved is monetary. Koontz v. Saint Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct.
2586 (2013). In Koontz, the Court discussed the policy behind the unconditional conditions
doctrine, which included the prevention of coercion between the state and the individual property
owner, as well as a balancing of costs and harm between the public and individual property
owners. Id. at 2594-95.
69 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386.
70 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386, 391.
71 See Nollan, 483 U.S at 834-35 (noting that "a broad range of governmental purposes and
regulations satisfies [the] requirement[]" that a "legitimate state interest" be "substantially
advanced").
72 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
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property. 7 The purpose of the easement was to permit the public to access the
two adjacent public beaches on either side of the Nollans' property.74 The
Commission claimed that the condition was necessary in order to "protect[] the
public's ability to see the beach, assist[] the public in overcoming the
'psychological barrier' to using the beach created by a developed shorefront,
and prevent[] congestion on the public beaches. 7 5 The Supreme Court did not
find there to be an essential nexus between the condition and the state's
interest. The Court, therefore, held that the Commission could not, without
paying just compensation, condition the grant of the permit on such a
requirement.7 6 Because the Commission failed to meet the "essential nexus"
requirement, the Court did not reach the second question of the unconstitutional
conditions analysis.77
ii. Rough Proportionality
The second analytical prong of the unconsfitutional conditions doctrine
was addressed by the Court in Dolan. In Dolan, the Planning Commission of
the City of Tigard, Oregon conditioned the approval of a landowner's
application to expand her store and pave her parking lot upon her agreeing to
dedicate land for (1) a public greenway along an adjacent creek and (2) a public
pedestrian/bicycle pathway.78 The Planning Commission claimed that the
purpose of the greenway was to minimize flooding associated with the paving
and the resulting increase in impervious surfaces and that the public pathway
was needed to minimize traffic and congestion. 79 The Supreme Court found
that both dedication requirements constituted an uncompensated taking of
property despite the fact that there did exist an essential nexus between the
state's interest and the conditions imposed.80 Rather, the Court found that the
burden imposed on the property owner by the condition was not roughly
proportional when balanced against the state's interest, and was unduly
cumbersome.
73 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827.
74 Id. at 827-28.
75 Id. at 835.
76 Id. at 841-4 2 .
77 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386 ("We addressed the essential nexus question in Nollan.").
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B. Applying Penn Central to Actual Cases
The Penn Central factors can be applied to actual cases in order to
determine whether a previously-convicted person has suffered a regulatory
taking of his or her reputation. The following examples are cases brought in the
State of New York by three different, previously-convicted individuals. Each
case centers specifically on the deprivation of an employment-related
opportunity. Although collateral consequences touch many different areas of a
previously-convicted person's life,81 employment, or rather the lack of
employment, is a leading indicator of one's reentry success. As one scholar
noted, "Without employment, [the previously incarcerated] are three to five
times more likely to commit a crime than are those who gain employment after
,982prison.
Each case detailed below was brought in what is known as an "Article
78 proceeding." Sections 750 to 755 of the New York Correction Law provided
limited protection to previously-convicted individuals who claim that they have
been subjected to employment discrimination because of their criminal
records.83 The Correction Law applies to private and public employers and to
public agencies to which one must apply for a professional or vocational
license.84 Actions brought against public entities pursuant to the Correction
Law are governed by Article 78 of the New York civil practice law and rules.
85
Section 752 of the Correction Law provides:
No application for any license or employment... shall be
denied ... by reason of the individual's having been previously
convicted of one or more criminal offenses, or by reason of a
finding of lack of "good moral character" when such finding is
based upon the fact that the individual has previously been
convicted of one or more criminal offenses.
86
This provision has two exceptions: (1) if "there is a direct relationship between
one or more of the previous criminal offenses and the specific license or
81 Collateral consequences of conviction include, for example, voting limitations and
prohibitions, and exclusions from public benefits, public housing, loans and grants for higher
education, occupational and professional licenses and certain employment. See generally Michael
Pinard & Anthony C. Thompson, Offender Reentry and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal
Convictions: An Introduction, 30 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 585, 586-87 (2006)
(chronicling housing, employment, and voting rights barriers faced by the previously convicted).
82 Matthew C. Sonfield, Entrepreneurship and Prisoner Reentry: The Development of a
Concept, 35 SMALL Bus. INST. RES. REv. 193, 193 (2008).
83 See N. Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 750-755 (McKinney 2007).
84 Id. § 751.
85 Id. § 755.
86 Id. § 752.
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employment sought"; and (2) if "the issuance or continuation of the license or
granting or continuation of the employment would involve an unreasonable risk
to property or to the safety or welfare of specific individuals of the general
public.
87
Section 753(1) lists eight factors that must be considered in making a
determination pursuant to section 752.88 Moreover, under section 753(2) of the
Correction Law, "the public agency or private employer shall also give
consideration to a certificate of relief from disabilities or a certificate of good
conduct issued to the applicant., 89 A certificate of relief from disabilities may
be granted to a previously-convicted person with any number of misdemeanors
and no more than one felony conviction.90 One can apply for it immediately
upon sentencing.9' A previously-convicted individual who has more than one
felony conviction may be eligible for a certificate of good conduct after
completing her sentence and then satisfying a mandatory waiting period.92 In
employment and licensing determinations, both types of certificates give rise to
"a presumption of rehabilitation in regard to the offense specified therein. 93
The first and second Penn Central factors-the character of the
regulation and the extent of the law's interference with investment-backed
expectations-will be discussed below in conjunction with each case. The third
factor--diminution in value-will be analyzed in Part II.
87 Id.
88 The eight factors are: (1) "[t]he public policy of this state, as expressed in this act, to
encourage the licensure and employment of persons previously convicted of one or more
criminal offenses"; (2) "[t]he specific duties and responsibilities necessarily related to the license
or employment sought or held by the person"; (3) "[t]he bearing, if any, the criminal offense or
offenses for which the person was previously convicted will have on his fitness or ability to
perform one or more such duties or responsibilities"; (4) "[tlhe time which has elapsed since the
occurrence of the criminal offense or offenses"; (5) "[t]he age of the person at the time of
occurrence of the criminal offense or offenses"; (6) "the seriousness of the offense or offenses";
(7) "[a]ny information produced by the person, or produced on his behalf, in regard to his
rehabilitation and good conduct"; and (8) "[t]he legitimate interest of the public agency or private
employer in protecting property, and the safety and welfare of specific individuals or the general
public." Id. §§ 753(l)(a)-(h).
89 Id. § 753(2).
90 Id. § 702(2)(a).
91 Id. § 702(1)(b)(i).
92 Id. § 703-b(3). The waiting period for class C, D and E felonies is three years and for class
A and B felonies is five years. Id.
93 Id. § 753(2).
[Vol. 117
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1. Marc La Cloche
Marc La Cloche served 11 years of a 9-to- 16 year sentence for armed
robbery.94 Upon being paroled in 2000, La Cloche applied for an apprentice
barber's license.95 His application was denied by the New York State
Department of State's Division of Licensing Services on the ground that he
lacked the requisite moral character for licensure because of his previous
997conviction.96 La Cloche filed an administrative appeal to this denial and won.9 7
As a result, he was able to gain employment as an apprentice barber.
98
Unfortunately, his victory was short-lived, as he was only able to work as a
barber for five months.99 The State appealed the administrative law judge's
decision to the Secretary of State who reversed the AL's decision and revoked
La Cloche's license.100 La Cloche spent the rest of his life fighting this denial,
unsuccessfully attempting to obtain his barber's license. 101
i. The Character of the Regulation
In the initial administrative appeal, of the State's denial of his license
application, the administrative law judge did not find that La Cloche had good
character. 0 2 Rather, he found that "moral character is not a requirement for a
barbering license."'10 3 Moreover, on further appeal, the New York Supreme
Court found that a criminal conviction would not per se render one lacking in
good moral character. 1
04




98 In re La Cloche, No. 403466/2003, 2006 WL 6861431 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006).
99 Id.
1oo Id.
101 La Cloche won a posthumous moral victory. Justice Louis B. York of the Supreme Court,
New York County, in his opinion dismissing La Cloche's petition as moot due to his death, noted
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ii. Interference with Distinct Investment-Backed Expectations
While in prison, in addition to exhibiting good behavior, 10 5 La Cloche
made the following investments in his rehabilitation: (1) he completed a drug
rehabilitation program; (2) he earned his high school diploma; and (3) he took
barbering courses, which ultimately qualified him to apply for an apprentice
barber's license. 10 6 La Cloche took over 50 barbering classes, obtaining two
barbering training certificates and receiving credit for 14 months of training
towards his license.'
0 7
As a result of this investment, La Cloche's expectations regarding his
ability to lawfully practice as a barber were both distinctly perceived and
sharply crystallized. In fact, this expectation was further crystallized by his
brief, but successful, experiences as an apprentice barber. 0 8 Thus, La Cloche's
investment-backed expectation of living and working as a barber "was
frustrated by the imposition of a collateral consequence that directly impugned
his character and reputation."' 09 The crystallization of the expectation was
aided by the State itself, which trained La Cloche.' 10
iii. Diminution in Value
La Cloche was not seeking money damages as relief for the denial of
his barber's license."' Rather, he merely sought to have the license issued."
12
However, it is possible to make some determination of the economic value of
the reputational taking that he suffered. This can be done by accounting for the
amount that he made as an apprentice barber, when allowed to practice his
trade as such, less what he was able to earn when this livelihood was denied
him. As Judge Louis B. York of the New York Supreme Court pointed out, "As
a result [of the denial of his license,] Mr. La Cloche was forced to go on
105 Id. (citing La Cloche v. Daniels, 755 N.Y.S.2d 827, 828 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003)) (noting that
La Cloche "received good evaluations on a regular basis during his incarceration").
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. (noting that La Cloche's employers found him to be exemplary and that one employer
had said that if he opened a second barber shop location, that La Cloche would be his first choice
to manage it).
109 Jefferson-Jones, supra note 11, at 523.
Ito Justice Louis B. York of the Supreme Court, New York County, commented that "the State
successfully rehabilitated a citizen and then vigorously fought to deny him a right to live a
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welfare-earning a few dollars cleaning in the salons where he'd once cut hair,
occasionally cutting friends' hair for a small fee ....
2. Luis Soto
In 2004, Luis Soto was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon
in the fourth degree, for which he was incarcerated for one year.1 4 In 2008,
Soto applied for a school bus driver position with Consolidated Bus Transit
(Consolidated), a contractor that provided bus services to the New York State
Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities (OMRDD).'1 5
When Consolidated applied to OMRDD for approval of Soto's application,
OMRDD notified Consolidated that, because of Soto's criminal history, the
application would be denied.'1 16 However, prior to this denial, while the matter
was still under review with OMRDD, Soto applied for and received a
certificate of relief from disabilities for the Supreme Court, Kings County.t17
OMRDD was aware of and acknowledged the issuance of the certificate prior
to making its final decision. Yet, OMRDD ultimately decided to deny Soto's
application, citing his previous criminal conviction." 
8
i. The Character of the Regulation
In the case of Luis Soto, the Supreme Court, Kings County, found that
OMRDD's rejection of Soto as a bus driver was "arbitrary, capricious and an
abuse of discretion" because OMRDD failed to consider the eight factors listed
in section 753(1) of the Correction Law when considering Soto's employment
application.119 Additionally, the court held that OMRDD did not properly
consider the presumption of rehabilitation created by the court's earlier
granting of a certificate of relief from disabilities to Soto.
120
It is noteworthy that after Soto's application for the bus driver position
was denied, Consolidated offered him a position driving a van for children
under the care of the New York City Administration for Children Services
113 id.
114 Soto v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, No.






120 Id. at 8.
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(ACS). 2' Soto passed ACS's criminal background check and began working as
an ACS van driver in August 2008.122
ii. Interference with Distinct Investment-Backed Expectations
In the same year that Soto applied for the bus driver position with
Consolidated, he first obtained a New York State Commercial Drivers License,
Class B, with passenger and school bus endorsements. 123 This entailed passing
both a written and a school bus road test, in addition to paying the applicable
fees. 124
iii. Diminution in Value
Soto's economic losses are more easily quantifiable. He earned $11.50
per hour as an ACS van driver, but would have earned $12.50 per hour as an
OMRDD bus driver. 125 It is however, impossible to know if, once employed by
OMRDD, he would have had other, more lucrative opportunities within that
organization or if employment with OMRDD may have led to beneficial
opportunities outside of OMRDD.
3. Madeline Acosta
Madeline Acosta served nearly four years in prison after having been
convicted of four counts of robbery in the first degree in 1993.126 The robberies
were committed while she was a 17 year-old high school senior.' 27 Acosta was
released from prison on parole in 1996.128 In 2006, Acosta began a job as a
part-time administrative assistant at the Cooke Center for Learning
Development, a nonprofit that contracted with the New York City Department
of Education. 29 She worked at the Cooke Center for three months, after which
time the Department of Education performed a background check. 130 Upon
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 2.
124 See Get a CDL "S" Endorsement for School Bus Drivers, NEW YORK ST. DEPT. OF MOTOR
VEHICLES, http://dmv.ny.gov/commercial-drivers/get-cdl-%E2%80%9CsE2%80%9D-endorse
ment-school-bus-drivers (last visited Oct. 11, 2014).
125 Soto v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, No.
3010/09, slip. op. at 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 29, 2010).
126 Acosta v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Educ., 62 A.D.3d 455, 456 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).
127 Id.
128 Id.
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learning of her prior conviction (which she had previously voluntarily disclosed
to the Cooke Center), the Department of Education denied Acosta's application
for permanent employment.
i. The Character of the Regulation
Acosta brought an Article 78 proceeding seeking to overturn the
Department of Education's denial of her continued employment with the Cook
Center. 132 The Supreme Court, New York County, denied Acosta's petition and
dismissed the proceeding. 33 However, on appeal, the Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, held that the Department of Education's denial of Acosta's
application was arbitrary and capricious. 1
34
ii. Interference with Distinct Investment-Backed Expectations
Acosta's employment application was rejected by the Department of
Education 13 years after her conviction and a decade after she was released
from prison. 35 Between the time that she was released from prison and the time
that she began working at the Cooke Center, she earned a college degree,
married, and started a family. 36 During this time period, she also worked at
various law firms as a paralegal/administrative assistant.
37
iii. Diminution in Value
Like La Cloche, Acosta did not initially seek money damages.
138
Rather she sought reinstatement of her employment with the Cooke Center.'
39
However, as the proceeding progressed, Acosta attempted to recoup monetary
damages for her lost employment.' 40 Ultimately, this attempt failed because of
a procedural misstep: she did not timely submit a notice of claim to the
131 Id.
132 Acosta v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 400475/07, 2007 WL 6839460 (N.Y. App. Div. July
6, 2007).
133 Id.
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Department of Education. 141 The court noted, however, that but for the failure
to timely submit the notice of claim, Acosta's restitution claim would have
been compensable. 1
42
C. Applying the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine
1. Essential Nexus
Applying the "essential nexus" requirement of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine to a previously-convicted person's takings claim will yield
much the same result as the application of the "character of the regulation"
factor of the Penn Central multi-factor balancing test. For example, in the case
of Marc La Cloche, just as the New York Supreme Court did not find that good
character was necessary for the issuance of a barber's license, it could just as
well have found that there was no essential nexus between the state's interest in
providing the public with properly-trained barbers and any condition that such
barbers have good moral character. Likewise, the court's finding that the denial
of Luis Soto's and Madeline Acosta's continued state employment was
arbitrary and capricious should also support a finding of no essential nexus
between the state's interest in protecting children and any condition that would
permanently bar Soto or Acosta from using their rehabilitated reputations to
gain and retain employment.
2. Rough Proportionality
In the event that a court could overcome the first prong of the
unconstitutional conditions analysis, the same reasoning applied by the
Supreme Court in Dolan can be applied in each of the La Cloche, Soto and
Acosta case studies. The burden of unemployment imposed on La Cloche,
Acosta, and Soto is not roughly proportional when balanced against the state's
interest in public safety. Although it may not be said that the burden of their
criminal past "should be borne by the public alone,"'143 shifting the entire




143 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994).
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III. WHY REBIOGRAPHY Is NECESSARY
A. Statistics on Employment and Recidivism
One scholar has noted that "as many as one in five individuals in
America have a criminal history.' This number includes those who have
been convicted of a crime, as well as those who have merely been arrested.
Moreover, the number of individuals who reenter society annually after having
been incarcerated is increasing due to states' efforts to reduce prison
populations that exploded as a result of the War on Drugs and "tough-on-
crime" policies. 145 This makes more urgent the need to address the reentry
challenges faced by the previously convicted, particularly in the critical area of
employment.
There is a correlation between employment and recidivism: previously-
convicted individuals who are able to find gainful employment are less likely to
reoffend. Conversely, when the previously convicted cannot find work, they are
three to five times more likely to reoffend than those who are employed after
prison.146 Research by the Bureau of Justice Statistics noted high recidivism
rates among former prisoners in the first year after release: 44% are rearrested,
22% reconvicted, and 10% are incarcerated again on a new sentence. 147 These
recidivism rates are exacerbated by poor employment prospects.
Despite evidence that previously-convicted persons who gain
employment after incarceration are less likely to re-offend, this population
continues to face a number of employment barriers. This reality is reflected in
post-incarceration employment data. For example, an Urban Institute study
found that two months after release, only 31% of men released from prison had
found employment. 148 Moreover, the study's author noted that "[m]any
respondents had difficulty finding employment, and the majority (70%) felt that
their criminal record had affected their job search. For instance, many people
felt that background checks inhibited their ability to acquire a job and thought
employers did not want to hire someone with a criminal record."' 149 When
surveyed, employers confirmed this suspicion. As one researcher noted:
Employers remain fearful of hiring those with criminal records
and attribute many negative qualities to applicants with
'44 Geiger, supra note 20, at 1193.
145 See discussion of these policies, supra notes 6-11.
146 See Sonfield, supra note 82.
147 CHRISTY VISHER ET. AL, URBAN INSTITUTE JUSTICE POLICY CENTER, EMPLOYMENT AFTER
PRISON: A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF RELEASEES IN THREE STATES 8 (2008), available at
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/411778-employment-after-prison.pdf.
148 Id. at 6.
141 Id. at 3.
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criminal records, despite the fact that "reasonable efforts to
consider a prospective employee's background will generally
eliminate the risk of employer liability and the lack of
evidence that persons with criminal records are any more
likely to offend on the job than their counterparts."
' 150
The phenomenon of unemployment or underemployment is not simply
confined to those previously-convicted persons with low skill levels or limited
education. As one formerly incarcerated individual with a master's degree in
public administration stated, "Once my felony was detected ... all offers of
employment were rescinded immediately. I found myself joining the ranks of
the unemployable."'1 51
B. Employment Restrictions
Employer attitudes have historically been encouraged and reinforced
by public policy. The "tough-on-crime" stance adopted by many states in the
1980s resulted in numerous restrictions on the employment opportunities of the
previously convicted.152 For example, many states, counties, and local
governments instituted blanket bans on public employment. As recently as
2006, six states permanently denied public employment to those with felony
convictions. 53 The remaining 45 states "permit[ted] public employment of
convicted felons in varying degrees."'' 54 Although this trend is starting to
reverse itself as "ban-the-box" initiatives-those seeking to remove criminal
history inquiries from preliminary job applications-are adopted in various
states and municipalities, these initiatives have, thus far, not been adopted full-
scale, as only ten states have removed criminal history questions from their
150 JAMIE DOUGHERTY & JOHN KLOFAS, CENTER FOR PUB. SAFETY INITIATIVES ROCHESTER
INST. OF TECH., "BANNING THE BOX" TO INCREASE EX-OFFENDER EMPLOYMENT: RELATED ISSUES
AND A POLICY RESEARCH PROPOSAL FOR ROCHESTER, NY 3 (2014), available at
http://www.rit.edu/cla/criminaljustice/sites/rit.edu.cla.criminaljustice/files/docs/WorkingPapers/2
0 14/Ban%20the%20Box.pdf.
151 The Leadership Conference, Chapter VI: Out of Prison, Out of Work, CIVILRIGHTS.ORG,
http://www.civilrights.org/publications/reports/a-second-chance/chapter-6-out-of-prison-out.html
(last visited Oct. 11, 2014).
152 Pinard & Thompson, supra note 8 1, at 596; Anthony C. Thompson, Navigating the Hidden
Obstacles to Ex-Offender Reentry, 45 B.C. L. REv. 255, 280-81 (2004).
153 Deborah N. Archer & Kele S. Williams, Making America "The Land of Second Chances
Restoring Socioeconomic Rights for Ex-Offenders, 30 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 527, 536
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employment applications. 155 A more in-depth examination of ban-the-box and
its limitations is undertaken in Subsection C. 1 of this Part.
In addition to bans on public employment, the previously convicted are
also subject to professional and occupational licensing restrictions that decrease
their career prospects. 156 These restrictions may be outright bans on hiring or
licensing in fields such as law, medicine, dentistry, pharmacy, nursing and
education. They may also take the form of character requirements for licensing,
with ex-offender status serving as a proxy for unfit character.'57 Such
restrictions have a two-fold effect: they (1) prevent previously-convicted
individuals who worked in various career fields prior to their convictions from
obtaining reemployment in their professions, and (2) prevent previously-
convicted individuals from entering new career fields for which they have
trained while or after serving their sentences.
158
C. Providing "Just Compensation" via Rebiography
In La Cloche's case, Judge York noted the non-economic and perhaps
immeasurable damage suffered by La Cloche: La Cloche, he said, sank "into a
depression from which he never recovered.' ' 159 Although we know how much
money Soto would have made as a bus driver for Consolidated, rather than as
an ACS van driver, it is not possible to know the psychological toll that the
employment denial may have had on him. The same can be said for Acosta.
Thus, though economic damages existed in these cases, other types of damages
may have also been identifiable. For this reason, actual payment may be
inappropriate or at least ultimately impossible to calculate. Money damages are
most appropriate in the context of a taking of fungible property. 6° In such
cases, receiving money damages affords the complaining party the opportunity
to purchase like property-thus making her whole. 16 1 "One, however, cannot
simply purchase reputation, which is better characterized as personal or
constitutive property."'
' 62
Since monetary compensation cannot restore reputation, one must
explore other vehicles for "just compensation." The ongoing reputational
155 Dougherty & Klofas, supra note 150.
156 Archer & Williams, supra note 153, at 536; Pinard & Thompson, supra note 81, at 596;
Thompson, supra note 152, at 280-81.
157 See Jefferson-Jones, supra note 11, at 506-07 (discussion of ex-offender status as a proxy
for character); see also supra Part I.B. 1 (discussion of character requirement for licensing barbers
in the state of New York).
158 See Archer & Williams, supra note 153, at 536.
159 In re La Cloche, No. 403466/2003, 2006 WL 6861431 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006).
160 See MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 48 (1993).
161 Id.
162 Jefferson-Jones, supra note 11, at 526.
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damage suffered by those with ex-offender status can only be repaired by
proscribing the mechanisms via which such damages are affected. Rebiography
affords such an opportunity. It can be achieved via legislative or judicial
efforts, both of which are explored below.
1. Rebiography via Legislation
Some states and local governments have instituted "ban-the-box" laws
that prevent employers from inquiring about criminal history on preliminary
job applications. These efforts represent a partial rebiography effort in that they
allow the previously convicted to defer disclosing their status, but do not
ultimately prevent such disclosure. In fact, ban-the-box's goal is not to prohibit
criminal history inquiries; rather, it seeks "to encourage employers to consider
applicants based on their qualifications first and their conviction history
second.,
163
Ban-the-box laws vary from state-to-state and from city-to-city. All
such provisions bar public-sector employers from asking questions about
criminal history in the preliminary hiring process. 164 Some require the same of
government contractors.1 65 A smaller number impose similar restrictions on
private-sector employers.
166
Ban-the-box legislation is limited in its ability to protect the previously
convicted from employment discrimination, as it does not completely bar an
employer from running a criminal history background check on a potential
employee. 67 These laws only affect when in the application process the
criminal history inquiry can take place.168 It is then up to the employer to
decide how and whether to take into account the information gleaned. There
are, however, instances in which criminal history should not be disclosed-
namely when the information is not relevant to the job being sought.
Rebiography would put disclosure decisions in the hands of the previously
convicted.
It may be argued that, in some instances, disclosure must be mandatory
(such as in the case where one with a history of child abuse applies for a job
working with children). To be sure, certain guidelines must be in place. For
specific jobs, questions should be allowed with regard to specific crimes. This
practice, however, must be very narrowly confined. The norm should be that
163 Dougherty & Klofas, supra note 150, at 1.




168 See id. at 3.
[Vol. 117
26
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 117, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 9
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol117/iss1/9
REBIOGRAPHYAS "JUST COMPENSATION"
the previously convicted have the right to rebiography, barring a demonstrated
need or the disclosure of criminal history.'
69
2. Rebiography via the Courts
In A Good Name, I argued for a statutory solution to the problem of
affording a rebiography right to the previously convicted:
Even though this Article argues that the damaged reputation
suffered by the previously convicted amounts to a taking of
property without just compensation and thus, in theory should
result in a claim at law, a statutory remedy is more suitable for
reasons of efficienc € and practicality and in order to conserve
judicial resources.
Despite this pronouncement, it is still worthwhile to consider the use of the
courts to affect rebiography. Courts-whether reentry courts, takings courts, or
those that hear a traditional criminal docket-may offer a mechanism through
which the right to rebiography can be bestowed. Among these, reentry courts
may be best suited to affect this solution.
As currently configured, reentry courts monitor the reentry process,
providing support to parolees and other reentering individuals. 171 These courts
intervene at the "output-end of the [incarceration] cycle.., to supervise
prisoners on parole or supervised release upon their return to the
community."' 72 Currently, reentry courts, like other therapeutic, problem-
solving courts, can be problematic in that they raise concerns regarding both
possible due process violations and the appropriate role of the judiciary.173
Reentry courts can, however, be repurposed to fully incorporate therapeutic
justice goals. In such a posture, reentry courts would embrace "restorative
reentry," which, among other things, would incorporate rebiography and status
elevation proportionate to the status degradation currently suffered as a result
of ex-offender status.
169 This manner of rebiography would be similar to that enacted in the British 1974
Rehabilitation of Offenders Act ("ROA") under which certain offences are "spent" after a certain
number of years. Rehabilitation of Offenders Act, 1974, c. 53 (U.K.). Under the ROA, with some
exceptions, one does not have to disclose a spent conviction. Id. See Jefferson-Jones, supra note
11, at 529-31, for a discussion of rebiography under the ROA.
170 Id. at 528.
171 Eric J. Miller, Drugs, Courts, and the New Penology, 20 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 417, 417
(2004).
172 Id.
173 See Eric J. Miller, Embracing Addiction: Drug Courts and the False Promise of Judicial
Interventionism, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1479, 1494-95, 1517 (2004).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The ongoing reputational damage suffered by the previously convicted
rises to the level of an unconstitutional government taking of private property.
"Just compensation" in the form of a rebiography right due to previously-
convicted individuals is necessary to remedy this wrong. In addition to the
benefits that would be reaped by the previously convicted, society would
benefit by decreased recidivism and, thus, increase public safety.
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